The problem that the funny mind control cases illustrate is basically this: compatibilists say that free will is compatible with determinism and/or ultimate outside causation of our inner states. But there are SOME forms of ultimate outside causation/determination of our inner states which are clearly not compatible with free will in any sense; the fantasy/science fiction mind control cases are examples of such.
So the compatibilist has to either offer a distinction between 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' ultimate outside causation of our mental states to handle these cases or else she has to show that the kind of mind control in question is logically impossible. The latter seems doubtful; what about the former?
The only move the compatibilist seems to be able to make here is some kind of 'proper function' theory of the mind, whereby a properly functioning mind does/can have freedom of the will, whereas a disturbed/broken/stuck one doesn't. We'll talk about these theories in class - there are a few out there already, though I don't know if they are motivated by mind control considerations or not. But the idea is that addiction, compulsion, mind control, etc. interfere with the mind's proper function and in so doing make it un-free.
No comments:
Post a Comment