The problem that the funny mind control cases illustrate is basically this: compatibilists say that free will is compatible with determinism and/or ultimate outside causation of our inner states. But there are SOME forms of ultimate outside causation/determination of our inner states which are clearly not compatible with free will in any sense; the fantasy/science fiction mind control cases are examples of such.
So the compatibilist has to either offer a distinction between 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' ultimate outside causation of our mental states to handle these cases or else she has to show that the kind of mind control in question is logically impossible. The latter seems doubtful; what about the former?
The only move the compatibilist seems to be able to make here is some kind of 'proper function' theory of the mind, whereby a properly functioning mind does/can have freedom of the will, whereas a disturbed/broken/stuck one doesn't. We'll talk about these theories in class - there are a few out there already, though I don't know if they are motivated by mind control considerations or not. But the idea is that addiction, compulsion, mind control, etc. interfere with the mind's proper function and in so doing make it un-free.
Saturday, November 13, 2010
Wednesday, November 10, 2010
External Control
The idea that if we identify with something we can't be unfree with respect to it is interesting, but I thought of an example that may show it to not be quite correct.
The Stoic or Spinozist may want to identify with the universe as a whole, and by so doing they may in a certain sense increase their freedom, or even gain freedom, with respect to it. But it seems important even in this case that there is a free individual acquiescence to nature.
Consider the following case: Brakmorn loves the sorceress Xanthippe with all his heart, and she loves him in return; their purposes are intertwinable, and each loves the other so thoroughly that every object of desire of each is an object of desire for the other, reinforced by second-order desires to make the others' desires desires of their own.
Xanthippe wants to gift Brakmorn with a magical sword from an ancient tomb, a sword Brakmorn himself has long coveted. Only Brakmorn's body has the physical strength to loot the tomb, but without Xanthippe's knowledge of sorcery, he won't be able to defuse the ancient lich-king's magical traps.
So, Xanthippe possesses him and uses his body to navigate the tomb's dangers, in the usual science-fantasy way.
Now: Brakmorn wants the sword, wants Xanthippe's help, wants to be mind-controlled by Xanthippe, etc. One may suppose that they are as one in love and unity of will and that there is no respect in which their desires diverge from one another even slightly.
But in spite of all this, Brakmorn does not act freely when he gives himself over to Xanthippe's sorcery to be mind controlled. He gives up his freedom freely and wholeheartedly, but he still gives it up, and thus is not free.
It seems that whatever our theory of freedom involves, we need some kind of condition ruling out external control.
This, in turn, seems like it might be a problem for compatibilism in general, insofar as determinism looks a lot like external control. Why is Xanthippe's sorcery out if physical laws are in?
One way around this which has been explored in the literature is a proper function condition on the brain/mind. (I'll have an article on this for the class a little bit later.) That is, one might hold that a mind appropriately situated in its environment and properly functioning is free, but that OCD, drug addiction, or Xanthippe's sorcery interfere with that proper function, and thus undermine freedom. I don't think proper function is sufficient for even compatibilist free will, but I do think that external control cases might show us that it's a necessary condition that needs to be added on.
Assuming it works to overcome them, which I'm not sure it does.
Another tactic one might take is to argue that 'the idea of mind control' presupposes libertarian free will so that the fantasy/science fiction cases aren't relevant. You never know I guess.
The Stoic or Spinozist may want to identify with the universe as a whole, and by so doing they may in a certain sense increase their freedom, or even gain freedom, with respect to it. But it seems important even in this case that there is a free individual acquiescence to nature.
Consider the following case: Brakmorn loves the sorceress Xanthippe with all his heart, and she loves him in return; their purposes are intertwinable, and each loves the other so thoroughly that every object of desire of each is an object of desire for the other, reinforced by second-order desires to make the others' desires desires of their own.
Xanthippe wants to gift Brakmorn with a magical sword from an ancient tomb, a sword Brakmorn himself has long coveted. Only Brakmorn's body has the physical strength to loot the tomb, but without Xanthippe's knowledge of sorcery, he won't be able to defuse the ancient lich-king's magical traps.
So, Xanthippe possesses him and uses his body to navigate the tomb's dangers, in the usual science-fantasy way.
Now: Brakmorn wants the sword, wants Xanthippe's help, wants to be mind-controlled by Xanthippe, etc. One may suppose that they are as one in love and unity of will and that there is no respect in which their desires diverge from one another even slightly.
But in spite of all this, Brakmorn does not act freely when he gives himself over to Xanthippe's sorcery to be mind controlled. He gives up his freedom freely and wholeheartedly, but he still gives it up, and thus is not free.
It seems that whatever our theory of freedom involves, we need some kind of condition ruling out external control.
This, in turn, seems like it might be a problem for compatibilism in general, insofar as determinism looks a lot like external control. Why is Xanthippe's sorcery out if physical laws are in?
One way around this which has been explored in the literature is a proper function condition on the brain/mind. (I'll have an article on this for the class a little bit later.) That is, one might hold that a mind appropriately situated in its environment and properly functioning is free, but that OCD, drug addiction, or Xanthippe's sorcery interfere with that proper function, and thus undermine freedom. I don't think proper function is sufficient for even compatibilist free will, but I do think that external control cases might show us that it's a necessary condition that needs to be added on.
Assuming it works to overcome them, which I'm not sure it does.
Another tactic one might take is to argue that 'the idea of mind control' presupposes libertarian free will so that the fantasy/science fiction cases aren't relevant. You never know I guess.
Sunday, November 7, 2010
Morality and Libertarian Free Will
This is just a 'how things fit together' note, but I wanted to get it up here.
Here is one dilemma that faces the partisan of free will:
1. If our will is determined by (reasons, beliefs, desires, etc.), then it is not free, because something prior to it determines it.
2. If our will is undetermined by (reasons, beliefs, desires, etc.), then it is not free, because acting on the basis of anything besides (reasons, beliefs, desires, etc.) is senseless/pointless/irrational, and any freedom of will worth wanting requires rationality.
3. Our will is either determined or undetermined by (reasons, beliefs, desires, etc.).
Conclusion, as usual: There is no free will.
Now, one option is simply to deny (1), and say that if the reasons/beliefs/desires etc. are 'ours' in the appropriate sense, acting on their basis is too free action. This response is most easily articulated within a compatibilist framework; it seems to a first degree of approximation anyway to be Frankfurt's answer.
The denial of (2) is also possible, and I take it that this may be where the Kant/Campbell/Wolf idea that morality is a necessary condition of free action comes in. That is, let's say that we have this completely undetermined ability to choose that the libertarian wants. Aren't its movements effectively arbitrary, by definition?
Certain conceptions of morality, particularly deontological ones, seem to provide a possible 'no' answer to this question. You can assess your situation, determine what morality dictates ought to be done in it, and then will that, entirely indepedently of the actual reasons/beliefs/desires you had going into the situation. You subordinate your will to the moral law and act in accordance with it, and in this you show your freedom.
It is actually rather hard to understand this response. First of all, the person who acts this way is effectively sublimating their beliefs and desires to the moral law - they would seem to have to want to do good in order to act on this basis. So aren't they actually just showing that the moral law is for them the kind of reason/belief/desire etc. that it is not always for everyone else? And isn't their will then in this case also fundamentally un-free because it is being determined by prior reasons, etc.?
I think the idea here has to be that, if we do indeed have an undetermined ability to determine what we do irrespective of our own reasons/beliefs/desires/etc., the only way to avoid arbitrariness is to find a principle for action that would apply to everyone in that situation. (Kant uses this kind of formulation all the time, of course.) We may make our action depend on anything we like and of course we may fill it in directly with our actual current beliefs and desires, irrespective of the moral law. Some people arguably never do anything else. But if there are general moral laws which govern our situation, following them is not arbitrary, just because they are the laws that everyone ought to follow in those situations. Thus in following them, I think the thought must go, our hypothesized libertarian free will can be undetermined without being arbitrary or irrational, because there is a rationality beyond that of satisfying our own reasons/beliefs/desires out there upon which we can act.
It is often said that we need free will for morality to make sense. This line of thinking is interesting because it seems to suggest we need morality in order for free will to make sense.
Here is one dilemma that faces the partisan of free will:
1. If our will is determined by (reasons, beliefs, desires, etc.), then it is not free, because something prior to it determines it.
2. If our will is undetermined by (reasons, beliefs, desires, etc.), then it is not free, because acting on the basis of anything besides (reasons, beliefs, desires, etc.) is senseless/pointless/irrational, and any freedom of will worth wanting requires rationality.
3. Our will is either determined or undetermined by (reasons, beliefs, desires, etc.).
Conclusion, as usual: There is no free will.
Now, one option is simply to deny (1), and say that if the reasons/beliefs/desires etc. are 'ours' in the appropriate sense, acting on their basis is too free action. This response is most easily articulated within a compatibilist framework; it seems to a first degree of approximation anyway to be Frankfurt's answer.
The denial of (2) is also possible, and I take it that this may be where the Kant/Campbell/Wolf idea that morality is a necessary condition of free action comes in. That is, let's say that we have this completely undetermined ability to choose that the libertarian wants. Aren't its movements effectively arbitrary, by definition?
Certain conceptions of morality, particularly deontological ones, seem to provide a possible 'no' answer to this question. You can assess your situation, determine what morality dictates ought to be done in it, and then will that, entirely indepedently of the actual reasons/beliefs/desires you had going into the situation. You subordinate your will to the moral law and act in accordance with it, and in this you show your freedom.
It is actually rather hard to understand this response. First of all, the person who acts this way is effectively sublimating their beliefs and desires to the moral law - they would seem to have to want to do good in order to act on this basis. So aren't they actually just showing that the moral law is for them the kind of reason/belief/desire etc. that it is not always for everyone else? And isn't their will then in this case also fundamentally un-free because it is being determined by prior reasons, etc.?
I think the idea here has to be that, if we do indeed have an undetermined ability to determine what we do irrespective of our own reasons/beliefs/desires/etc., the only way to avoid arbitrariness is to find a principle for action that would apply to everyone in that situation. (Kant uses this kind of formulation all the time, of course.) We may make our action depend on anything we like and of course we may fill it in directly with our actual current beliefs and desires, irrespective of the moral law. Some people arguably never do anything else. But if there are general moral laws which govern our situation, following them is not arbitrary, just because they are the laws that everyone ought to follow in those situations. Thus in following them, I think the thought must go, our hypothesized libertarian free will can be undetermined without being arbitrary or irrational, because there is a rationality beyond that of satisfying our own reasons/beliefs/desires out there upon which we can act.
It is often said that we need free will for morality to make sense. This line of thinking is interesting because it seems to suggest we need morality in order for free will to make sense.
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