External Control

The idea that if we identify with something we can't be unfree with respect to it is interesting, but I thought of an example that may show it to not be quite correct.

The Stoic or Spinozist may want to identify with the universe as a whole, and by so doing they may in a certain sense increase their freedom, or even gain freedom, with respect to it. But it seems important even in this case that there is a free individual acquiescence to nature.

Consider the following case: Brakmorn loves the sorceress Xanthippe with all his heart, and she loves him in return; their purposes are intertwinable, and each loves the other so thoroughly that every object of desire of each is an object of desire for the other, reinforced by second-order desires to make the others' desires desires of their own.

Xanthippe wants to gift Brakmorn with a magical sword from an ancient tomb, a sword Brakmorn himself has long coveted. Only Brakmorn's body has the physical strength to loot the tomb, but without Xanthippe's knowledge of sorcery, he won't be able to defuse the ancient lich-king's magical traps.

So, Xanthippe possesses him and uses his body to navigate the tomb's dangers, in the usual science-fantasy way.

Now: Brakmorn wants the sword, wants Xanthippe's help, wants to be mind-controlled by Xanthippe, etc. One may suppose that they are as one in love and unity of will and that there is no respect in which their desires diverge from one another even slightly.

But in spite of all this, Brakmorn does not act freely when he gives himself over to Xanthippe's sorcery to be mind controlled. He gives up his freedom freely and wholeheartedly, but he still gives it up, and thus is not free.


It seems that whatever our theory of freedom involves, we need some kind of condition ruling out external control.

This, in turn, seems like it might be a problem for compatibilism in general, insofar as determinism looks a lot like external control. Why is Xanthippe's sorcery out if physical laws are in?

One way around this which has been explored in the literature is a proper function condition on the brain/mind. (I'll have an article on this for the class a little bit later.) That is, one might hold that a mind appropriately situated in its environment and properly functioning is free, but that OCD, drug addiction, or Xanthippe's sorcery interfere with that proper function, and thus undermine freedom. I don't think proper function is sufficient for even compatibilist free will, but I do think that external control cases might show us that it's a necessary condition that needs to be added on.

Assuming it works to overcome them, which I'm not sure it does.

Another tactic one might take is to argue that 'the idea of mind control' presupposes libertarian free will so that the fantasy/science fiction cases aren't relevant. You never know I guess.