This is the list from class, reproduced for convenience. If anyone sees things that need to be added or has questions, let me know!
(1) Object-causes which (a) do not reduce to event causes, and (b) which have originating events 'in time'.
(2) An account of objects taking on states which keeps the object which takes on the state as an object-cause of the state. (This might be easy, actually, since an object's taking on a state (e.g. putting your bike into 3rd gear) clearly involves the object, and if you have (1) and (3) and (4) worked out that's probably all you need to get this too. But it seems as though you might need it if you think that human beings aren't 'brute' causes so much as beings that cause things by getting into particular states).
(3) There are 'emergent' objects which satisfy (1) and (2) and which do not 'reduce' to their constituent parts, because they introduce 'new causal powers' into the world that cannot be fully analyzed in terms of the causal powers of their parts.
(4) Persons are objects of type (3).
(5) 'Willings', 'intentions', 'tryings', 'attemptings', or some subset and/or aspect thereof - the agent-component of actions - are among the states of type (2) that persons take on.
It seems as though if you have these five things you have the best an emergentist can do for naturalized free will. Human beings bring new causal powers into the world which do not fully depend on their constitution and only depend on what has come before them in the sense that whatever assembled the persisting emergent physical structure which leads them to emerge was the cause of their coming-to-be, but not (somehow - this is the point pressed earlier) of their actions.
So then, can we get (1)-(5)? And if we do, is this free will, or is there still something missing? What is it?
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